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Abstract:
Using panel data from emerging oil and gas exporting countries, this paper
investigates whether oil and gas reserves have a significant impact on sovereign
spreads. The main findings are that oil and gas reserves affect differently fi-
nancial markets. Indeed, oil reserves increase spreads, contrary to gas reserves
that lower them. The evidence shows that financial markets’ reaction depends
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introduced, financial markets give more importance to political stability and
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1 Introduction
Many oil countries use their oil reserves in order to borrow on international
financial markets. Oil is usually seen by credit rating agencies as a good collat-
eral, as they view it as a liquid asset and its stock is more or less known. This
practice, called asset-backed securitization of future-flow receivables, flourished
after the Mexican crisis in 1994-95, especially in Latin Americas countries such
as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela. For Ketkar and Ratha (2001), ”Nearly
one-half of the dollar amounts raised via future flow transactions are backed by
oil and gas export receivables.” Nevertheless, this financial method has some
drawbacks. For example, the presence of proven oil reserves gave Nigeria a
credit-rating far higher than its macroeconomic fundamentals would have oth-
erwise justified, and the country had to struggle with a huge debt for years.
For most of emerging oil economies, which are usually not very diversified, the
current deep drop of oil prices represents a dramatic fall of oil revenues. There-
fore, the issue of debt overhang can become even more critical, and the risk of a
sovereign default could be looming. It could be the case of Venezuela, which is
currently strangled by its debt, or Russia that fears a deep recession. This risk
can be represented by sovereign bond spreads, that abruptly rise when financial
markets fear a sovereign default.
This article examines the effects of oil and gas reserves on those sovereign spreads
in emerging oil and gas countries, and investigates wheteher financial markets
view differently oil and gas. According to the U.S Energy Information Ad-
ministration, oil and gas proved reserves are defined as ”quantities of oil and
gas, which, by analysis of geoscience and engineering data, can be estimated
with reasonable certainty to be economically producible from a given date for-
ward, from known reservoirs, and under existing economic conditions, operating
methods, and government regulations.”
The literature mainly focuses on oil importing developped economies (usu-
ally the United States and European economies) or on emerging countries. Some
papers have brought to the fore the determinants of sovereign spreads in emerg-
ing countries. For example, Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) investigate the effects
of macroeconomic fundamentals on emerging market sovereign credit spreads.
Akitoby and Stratmann (2008) study the impact of fiscal policy on sovereign
risk spreads, and the relation between political institutions and fiscal indicators.
They show that the composition of fiscal policy matters. Indeed, revenue-based
adjustments lower spreads more than spending-based adjustments, and cuts in
current spending decrease spreads more than cuts in investment. One strand
of the literature focuses more precisely on oil, level of debt, and risk of de-
fault through sovereign spreads. Kretzmann and Nooruddin (2005) examine
the relationship between oil and debt and find that increasing oil production
is associated with increasing debt. Van der Ploeg and Venable (2010) study
optimal policies for resource-rich developing countries, which often face high
domestic interest rate. They provide empirical evidence on the interest rate
those economies have to pay, and find that the ratio of resource exports to GDP
is not statistically significant. Moreover, some authors have empazised the role
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of the oil price in the risk of default. Sharma and Thuraisamy (2013) find that
oil price uncertainty predicts the change in Credit Deafult Swaps (CDS) spreads
of some Asian countries. Alexandre and Benoist (2011) show that oil prices in-
fluence the government bond risk premium, and that an increase in oil prices is
expected to decrease the CDS spreads of emerging markets. Another brand of
the literature emphazises on natural resource wealth and institutional variables,
and more precisely on oil and conflicts (Ross, 2006), and corruption.
I fill the gap by studying empirically the relation between sovereign spreads
and oil and gas reserves, through a panel of ten emerging oil and gas exporting
countries between 1994 and 2014. The article contributes to the empirical liter-
ature by introducing oil and gas reserves as determinants of sovereign spreads.
The literature usually focuses mainly on macroeconomic and financial variables,
at the local and global level, but does not take into account geological variables.
The other contribution is to study different natural resources, like gas, and not
just examine oil itself as many articles do. I then introduce some institutional
variables in the model, such as corruption, political stability, democracy in order
to investigate whether the interaction between oil, gas reserves and institutional
quality can affect spreads.
The main results of this study are:
- oil reserves increase spreads whereas gas reserves lower spreads,
- the effect of oil reserves on spreads depends more on the institutional quality
of the country than gas reserves.
In fact, oil reserves increase spreads when the level of corruption and political
risks are high, but lower spreads in political stable and not corrupt countries.
Gas reserves decrease spreads, whatever the institutional quality of the country
is.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts and
the theoretical background. Section 3 discusses the econometric framework.
Section 4 reports the empirical findings.
2 Stylized facts and theoretical framework
2.1 Some stylized facts
2.1.1 History of default in emerging oil countries
Among recent defaults by Mexico (1982), Russia (1998), Ecuador (1999) and
Argentina (2001, 2014), and the current debt crises of Greece, it is worth to
underline that many of them are oil and gas exporting countries. Surprisingly,
their level of debt was not that high. In fact, Mexico’s 1982 debt crisis occurred
at a ratio of debt to GNP of 47 percent, and Argentinas 2001 crisis at a ratio
slightly above 50 percent. Thus, oil and gas reserves do not seem to prevent
from sovereign risk, but it will be interesting to see how those reserves can in
fact be viewed by financial markets, when oil and gaz exporting countries issue
their debts.
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On average the maturity of sovereign oil countries’debt is a long-term debt,
usually issued in US dollar. Mainly Paris Club Members (such as France, UK,
USA, Germany Japan), and also multilateral creditors hold those sovereign
debts.
2.2 Theoretical background
The framework refers to Edwards’ model (1984, 1986). It is assumed that lenders
are risk-neutral. The equilibrium condition is:
(1 − r∗) = pB + (1 − p)(1 + r)
with r∗ the worl interest rate, p the probability of default, r the lending rate
and B the amount paid by the borrower in default to the lender.
From this condition, the country’s risk represented by the spread s is given
by:
s =
p(1 + r∗ −B)
1 − p
Following the litterature on sovereign risk theory, the probability of default
can be expressed as:
p =
exp(
∑n
i=1 µiWi)
1 + exp(
∑n
i=1 µiWi)
with Wi the determinants of the probability of default.
By using the previous equations, and transforming it with a logarithmic
function, it leads to:
logs = logj +
n∑
i=1
µiWi + i
with i the random disturbance.
3 The empirical specification
I investigate whether oil and gas reserves have an impact on sovereign spreads,
and if they are viewed the same way by financial markets.
3.1 The variables
As there are many macroeconomic determinants of spreads in the literature,
we took the same control variables as Akitoby and Stratmann (2008), which
are the variables the more widely used in the literature: the ratio of external
debt to Growth National Income (GNI), the history of default, the regional
spread index, the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to Growth Domestic Product
(GDP), inflation (Consumer Price Index), and the output gap. External debt
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is a fundamental determinant of sovereign spread, and it is expected to have
a positive sign. The history of default is a dummy variable, which reveals if
the country is in default or not for the year studied. As Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009) emphazise, Venezuela can be seen as a ”modern-day sovereign default
champion” as it has defaulted 10 times since 1830. The regional spread index
gives a good idea of the risk of contagion in the region, as usually those countries
have tight lies with their commercial neighbours. For example, the Argentinian
2001 crisis had an impact on the Brazilian economy. Foreign exchange reserves
is also a major determinant of spreads, as is represents the capacity of a country
to pay back its debt, it should have a negative sign and thus lower spreads. Oil
and gas countries usually accumulate huge amounts of foreign reserves. Inflation
reveals the macroeconomic stability of the economy, so if inflation is low it shoud
be positively vewed by financial markets. Output gap gives more information
than the economic growth, as it takes into account potential growth.
Oil and gas reserves, which are considered as stocks and represent natural
resource wealth, are added to those variables. Production and exports variables,
which are seen as flows, are also taken into account.
3.2 Testing the impact of oil and gas reserves on spreads
The following formulation is used for the baseline model:
Logspread = αi+δdebtit+
∑
β′Cit+γ1OilReserveit+γ2GasReserveit+µt+it
(1)
where debtit is the ratio of external debt to Gross National Income, Cit is a
vector of control variables, OilReserveit is the proved oil reserves, GasReserveit
the proved gas reserves, αi a country fixed effect, µt the time fixed effect and
it are the error terms. I used as control variables the history of default, the
regional spread index, the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to GDP, inflation,
and the output gap.
3.3 Testing the interactions between oil and gas reserves
and institutional quality
The specification for testing the interactions between oil and gas reserves and
corruption is:
Logspread = αi+δdebtit+
∑
β′Cit+
∑
γ′Rit+λInstitit+
∑
φ(RitInstitit)+µt+it
(2)
where Institit represents institutional variables, such as the level of cor-
ruption, political stability, democracy; Rit stands for oil and gas reserves,
RitInstitit is the interaction between oil and gas reserves and those institu-
tional variables.
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4 Data and Results
4.1 The data
The analysis is based upon data recorded at an annual frequency, over the 1994
2014 period, in 10 emerging oil countries: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador,
Mexico, Venezuela, Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia, and Nigeria.
The dependent variable is the annual mean spread, which is obtained from
the JP Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Global (EMBI Global). This
index includes U.S. dollar denominated Brady bonds, Eurobonds, traded loans,
and local market debt instruments issued by sovereign and quasi-sovereign en-
tities. It considers only emerging markets issues over US dollar 500 million and
with a maturity of at least two years and a half. The measures of financial
variables are extracted from the Datastream.
Macroeconomic variables are obtained from the World Bank indicator and
the International Monetary Fund. Institutional variables are from the World
Bank Governance Index.
Oil and gas reserves come from the US Energy Information Agency (EIA).
Oil reserves are crude oil proved reserves in billion barrels, and gas reserves are in
billion metric tons. The oil price is represented by the West Texas Intermediate
(WTI) and expressed in dollars. The gas price is from a natural gas futures
contract in dollars per million British thermal units (Btu).
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Impact on spreads
As shown in Table 2, some of the control variables, as the debt to GNI ratio,
regional spread, the foreign exchange reserves to GDP ratio, are all significant
and have the expected sign. The ratio of the foreign exchange reserves to GDP
is negative, as it enables a country to service its debt and thus decreases the
risk of default. The coefficients of the debt to GNI ratio, regional spread, and
the history of default are on the contrary positive. Nevertheless, the output gap
and inflation are not significant.
Oil reserves and gas reserves are significant, but have opposite signs. Oil
variables tend to increase spreads, therefore financial markets penalize oil coun-
tries, whereas gas reserves tend to decrease spreads, as if markets give a premium
to countries detaining gas. Those results could be explained by the fact that
oil is seen as volatile, sold on spot markets, at short-term and at a global price.
Volatility hampers economic growth, and a sudden fall of oil price can stop
confortable revenues and jeopardize public investments. On the contrary, gas
is traded in the form of long-term supply contracts, and often through bilat-
eral relations, which ensure the producing country a steady flow of revenues.
It also secures the high capital investment necessary to develop and transport
gas. For financial markets, gas reserves would thus mean more stability, and
less volatility. The oil price appears to be significant at the 1% level, and have a
negative sign. This is in line with the results in the oil price literature. Indeed,
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the more oil prices increase, the more oil revenues grow, which lowers spreads.
Nevertheless, the gas price is not significant.
The impact of oil exports, oil production, gas exports, gas production on
spreads were also tested, but they all appear to be not significant. As they are
flows, high natural resource production and export represent current wealth.
But those current revenues could vanish rapidly if the country has no natural
resource reserves, which embody future wealth. This could explain why they
are not taken into account by financial markets. Oil and gas rents were also
used as explanatory variables. Expressed as a ratio of the GDP, those rents
come from the World Banks Adjusted Saving Project, defined as the difference
between the value of crude oil/gas production at world prices and total costs of
production. As for production and export variables, they were insignificant. A
country with important oil and gas rents, but with no major oil and gas reserves
is bound to see its revenues decrease (especially for not diversified economies),
and thus face more difficulty to pay its debt in the future. Therefore, financial
markets value more the future, represented by the oil and gas reserves, than the
present.
4.2.2 Interactions between oil and gas variables and institutional
quality
The introduction of institutional variables in the model is justified by the liter-
ature on oil and institutions. Studies on natural resource and conflict show that
natural resources are associated with social tensions (Auty and Gelb, 2001),
and that oil production often leads to civil war (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2002,
Ross, 2006). A negative correlation between natural resources and the level of
democracy in Africa has been brought to the fore by Jensen and Wantchekon
(2004). Moreover, oil extraction is usually associated with more corruption
(Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2009). I thus added in the regression a variable
standing for corruption, measured by the Transparency International Corrup-
tion Perception Index, that scores between 1 for high corruption and 10 for not
corrupt countries. I kept the same control variables, to see the impact of the in-
teraction between oil reserves and corruption, with the level of corruption itself,
on spread. The coefficient of oil reserves continues to be significant and positive.
The estimate of the interaction term between oil reserves and corruption is nega-
tive. The less a country is corrupted, the more the spread decreases. Therefore,
when oil reserves increase, the spread increases for countries plagued by sleaze,
whereas the spread lowers for not corrupt countries. Concerning gas reserves,
the coefficient is still negative, but is no longer significant. As it can be seen on
figure 2, spreads decrease for corrupt and not corrupt countries. Neverheless,
spreads lower faster for not corrupt countries. Therefore financial markets do
not seem to take into account corruption concerning gas reserves, contrary to
oil. This confirms my results that oil and gas reserves affect differently financial
markets.
As democracy and oil wealth are usually linked (Tsui, 2011, Arezki and
Bruckner, 2012), a dummy standing for democracy was added to examine the
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impact of an interaction between democracy and oil, gas reserves, but the co-
efficient appear not to be significant. The occurence of legislative and execu-
tive elections did not change my results either. I also introduced an interaction
with political stability, governement effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality
(that come from the Worldwide Governance Indicators project supported by the
World Bank) and political, civil rights (that are from Freedom of House). For
most of those variables, the estimates are insignificant and thus not reported.
It is interesting though to highlight that regulatory quality has a significant
impact on spreads, but oil and gas reserves are no longer significant. Never-
theless, when I interact oil and gas reserves with political stability the results
show that the impact of those reserves on spreads differ whether the country is
affected by conflicts or not. The political stability index scores from -2,5 when
the country is plagued by violent activities to 2,5 when it is stable. Oil and
gas reserves remain significant, with the same sign, but when the country is
politically unstable spreads increase more.
4.3 Robustness checks
Different sensitivity checks were performed. A range of econometric methods
was used and the results were still significant with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
and random effects. I also checked for stationarity with the Augmented Dickey
Fuller (ADF) test. All my variables were stationary, except oil price, so the first
difference of oil price was used.
The occurence of a currency crisis did not affect my results. Alternative
measures of solvency were used, which gave similar results. I also tested the
impact of being an OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries)
member, as OPEC members represent 75 % of the world’s total proven crude
reserves. This estimate is not statistically significant, while the results on the
oil and gas variables still hold. Moreover, removing large producers of both oil
and gas from the sample, like Algeria or Russia, increases the impact of oil and
gas reserves on sovereign spreads. Their estimates remain significant and keep
the same sign.
I also used lagged variables. The lagged value of the dependent variable was
significant at the 1 percent level. My results were still significant when we used
a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, I examined the impact of oil and gas variables on sovereign
spreads, using annual panel data in ten emerging oil ans gas exporting coun-
tries. My contribution is to take into account the impact of gas, unlike many
papers dealing with natural resources that only focus on oil. It enables me to
see if financial markets view the same way different natural resources. I then
introduced some institutional variables in the model, such as corruption, politi-
cal stability, democracy in order to investigate whether the interaction between
oil, gas reserves and institutional quality can have an impact on sovereign risk.
The evidence suggests that financial markets view differently oil and gas.
Indeed, I find that financial markets give a premium to gas reserves, that lower
spreads, and penalize on the contrary oil reserves, that increase them. One in-
terpretation is that gas tends to ensure constant revenues thanks to its long-term
supply contracts, usually through bilateral relations, at a regional level. On the
contrary, oil is much more exposed to volatility as it is traded at short-term on
spots markets at a global level. Moreover, oil is seen as more prone to conflicts,
corruption and political unrest. I thus interact those reserves with institutional
variables. I show that political stability and corruption affect sovereign spreads
when they interact with oil reserves. Indeed, oil reserves increase spreads when
the country is corrupt and political unstable, but lower spreads for not cor-
rupt country with a stable government. By contrast, whatever the institutional
quality is, gas reserves decrease spreads, even when the level of corruption and
political risks are high.
Those results suggest policy implications for those economies. First, oil and
gas countries should try to reduce gas flaring. Indeed, those countries usually
burn off the gas that is produced along with oil, as gas is much more costly in
terms of infrastructures and transport than oil. Taking actions to end flaring
would reduce their CO2 emissions and represent a good opportunity to trade
their gas, even though it is a costly investment. It would nevertheless be worth
it as they could secure other source of revenues than just oil throuh long-term
supply contracts. As my empirical results show, having gas reserves has the
advantage of lowering sovereign spreads, which means lowering their borrowing
cost on international capital markets, and thus let the government be able to
invest in productive areas of the economy, fostering economic growth. Those
countries with major gas reserves should value more the importance of this
natural resource and the advantages that come with it. Second, countries that
hold mainly oil reserves should try to fight more firmly against corruption and
take actions to end conflicts, as institutional quality is the key for decreasing
spreads.
Further research could also include data on oil discoveries to see if major
discoveries, synonymous of future wealth, could confirm our results.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Log of annual mean spread 6.308 0.908 3.237 8.664
External debt to gni 42.773 28.129 2.063 210.334
To be in default 0.220 0.415 0 1
Regional spread 458.275 261.959 133.391 2046.636
Foreign exghange reserves to gdp 19.224 19.742 1.221 113.045
Log inflation 2.317 1.083 -2.748 7.639
Log oil reserve 2.422 1.236 0.451 5.696
Log gas reserve 11.129 1.477 7.431 14.346
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Table 2: Effect of Oil and Gas Reserves on Spreads
(Dependent variable: annual mean spread)
Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
External debt to gni 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.017***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
To be in default 0.408** 0.370* 0.370*
(0.165) (0.184) (0.184)
Regional spread 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Foreign exghange reserves to gdp -0.040*** -0.032*** -0.032***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Log inflation 0.038 0.117* 0.117*
(0.074) (0.056) (0.056)
Log oil reserve 0.334*** 0.334***
(0.061) (0.061)
Log gas reserve -0.441*** -0.441***
(0.130) (0.130)
Oil price -0.048***
(0.005)
Constant 4.537*** 8.257*** 8.435***
(0.222) (1.350) (1.341)
Observations 141 141 141
R2 0.778 0.805 0.805
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All columns include year and country fixed effects.
The list of the 10 countries included in the sample is as follows: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil
Ecuador, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, and Venezuela
The time period is 1994-2014.
Statistical significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3: Effect of Oil and Gas Reserves on Spreads, with Interaction with
Institutional quality (Dependent variable: annual mean spread)
Corruption Political Stability Democracy
External debt to gni 0.014∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
To be in default 0.374 0.555∗∗ 0.337
(0.231) (0.213) (0.231)
Regional spread 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Foreign exghange reserves to gdp -0.023∗∗ -0.027∗∗ -0.023∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.008)
Log inflation 0.078∗ 0.115∗ 0.107∗∗
(0.035) (0.057) (0.042)
Log oil reserve 0.877∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗
(0.188) (0.097) (0.071)
Log gas reserve -0.574∗∗∗ -0.273∗∗ -0.549
(0.174) (0.103) (0.373)
Corruption -0.009
(0.544)
Log oil reserve × Corruption -0.172∗∗
(0.069)
Log gas reserve × Corruption 0.024
(0.063)
Political Stability -3.831∗∗∗
(1.167)
Log oil reserve × Political Stability -0.213
(0.216)
Log gas reserve × Political Stability 0.377∗∗
(0.141)
Democracy -0.779
(3.333)
Log oil reserve × Democracy 0.081
(0.131)
Log gas reserve × Democracy 0.072
(0.321)
Constant 9.909∗∗∗ 7.373∗∗∗ 10.249∗∗
(1.370) (1.085) (4.267)
Observations 136 113 141
R2 0.704 0.712 0.696
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All columns include year and country fixed effects.
The list of the 10 countries included in the sample is as follows: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador
Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, and Venezuela. The time period is 1994-2014.
Statistical significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 1: Impact of oil reserves on spread depending on the level of corruption
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ti_cpi stands for the Corruption Perception Index
Interaction between Oil reserves and Corruption
When ti cpi = 1 the level of corruption is high, when ti cpi = 5 the level of corruption is low.
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Figure 2: Impact of gas reserves on spread depending on the level of corruption
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When ti cpi = 1 the level of corruption is high, when ti cpi = 5 the level of corruption is
low.
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